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COMMENTS
FORM AND FUNCTION: FEDERAL STANDING
SINCE WARTH V. SELDIN
INTRODUCTION
The late 1960's and early 1970's witnessed a dramatic
move toward liberalized standing in the federal courts.' More
recently, the Supreme Court has endeavored to curb that trend
by reaffirming basic standing principles.2 In Warth v. Seldin"
and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization4
the Court elevated minimal constitutional criteria to the posi-
tion of a formidable standing barrier.' These cases have given
rise to a new constitutionally based test aimed at confining the
judiciary to its intended role. The distinguishing feature of this
new test is that it treats causation and effective relief as con-
trolling elements. Previous standing decisions have not re-
flected this overriding concern with either the causal relation-
ship between the defendant's alleged action and the plaintiff's
injury or the court's ability to forge an adequate remedy.
The standing approach outlined in Warth and Eastern
Kentucky marks a shift away from the recent focus on the
adversary context of a suit toward a stricter separation of pow-
1. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970);
Comment, Standing and Sovereign Immunity: Hurdles for Environmental Litigants,
12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 122 (1972).
2. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
3. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
4. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
5. The basic element of constitutional standing is "injury in fact." Such injury
originally had to be economic, but later cases have included noneconomic (i.e., aes-
thetic, conservational, recreational) injury within the concept. See, e.g., Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). This trend was reinforced by Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), which established a
two-pronged standing test. The first part of the test required that the plaintiff allege
that the challenged action had caused him injury in fact, and the second that the
interest sought to be protected was "arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 151,
153. Generally, courts interpreted the Data Processing test so liberally that almost any
allegation of injury was enough to satisfy the test. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 169 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT].
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ers analysis.' It has even been suggested that the latter has
emerged as the sole constitutional standing requirement.7 This
view does not yet prevail among all members of the Court,8 and
there are good reasons for believing that it will not.' Neverthe-
less, it appears likely that future cases will increasingly employ
standing as a means of maintaining a proper balance between
the judiciary and the other branches of government.
In addition to striking this balance, the new criteria lend
much needed clarity to the law of federal standing. Standing
doctrine has always been difficult to apply, with the result that
it has often failed to perform its intended function of screening
out unsuitable plaintiffs. Even though it is not yet applied with
mechanical precision, the new test appears to dispel much of
this confusion. Any difficulties flowing from this lack of preci-
sion will undoubtedly be minimized as court and counsel be-
come more familiar with the parameters of the criteria laid
down in Warth and Eastern Kentucky.
After briefly analyzing the basic principles of standing,
this comment will provide a comprehensive examination of the
new standing test. 0 Initially, this examination will focus on the
theoretical and functional foundations for both Warth and
Eastern Kentucky. Following this discussion, it will investigate
the lower court decisions which have attempted to determine
the scope of the new test and the difficulties they have encoun-
tered in applying it. Finally, this comment will suggest some
possible resolutions of these difficulties in light of the present
state of standing law.
6. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181 (1974); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
7. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 124 n.3 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring
and dissenting).
8. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
9. Justice Brennan, at least, is committed to the adversary context approach.
See text accompanying notes 85-89, 113 infra.
10. A truly comprehensive standing analysis is not within the scope of this work.
As Justice Frankfurther observed, standing is a "complicated speciality of federaljurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined
by the specific circumstances of individual situations .... " United States ex rel
Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). For a fuller discussion
of standing, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.00 (1976); K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22 (1958 & Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS TREATISE]; WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 175-237.
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BASIC STANDING PRINCIPLES
Generally speaking, standing focuses on the party raising
an issue and not on the issue raised: II
[T]he question of standing . .. is the question
whether the litigant has a sufficient personal interest in
getting the relief he seeks, or is a sufficiently appropriate
representative of other interested persons, to warrant giv-
ing him the relief, if he establishes the illegality al-
leged-and, by the same token, to warrant recognizing him
as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue of
illegality."2
Consequently, standing is seldom an issue except in cases con-
cerning administrative action," the constitutionality of a stat-
ute, 4 or other areas of public law." In private actions, there is
rarely any doubt as to the interest of a party, or the propriety
of his representative capacity."
Standing consists of two separate concepts which are
clearly defined in theory, but which are not always distin-
guished in practice. The first of these is the "irreducible"'"
requirement imposed by article III of the Constitution, that
federal courts decide only "cases and controversies."'" The sec-
ond is the set of "prudential"" limitations imposed by the
courts themselves as rules of "judicial self-restraint." ' The
11. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968). But see notes 139-140 and
accompanying text infra.
12. HART & H. H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156
(2d ed. 1973).
13. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
15. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 176.
16. Id.; K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22, at 722 (Supp. 1970).
17. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 181 (1974).
18. Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases af-
fecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases
of acimiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
20. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
19781
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"case or controversy" requirement is essentially immutable,
while the prudential limitations are subject to the court's dis-
cretion and to congressional modification.
Case or Controversy
The nature and function of the article III "case or contro-
versy" limitation on the federal judiciary has not yet been con-
clusively defined. One commonly propounded tenet, traceable
back at least as far as Muskrat v. United States,"' and clearly
articulated in Flast v. Cohen,22 is that "those words limit the
business of federal courts to questions presented in an adver-
sary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
resolution through the judicial process." 3 The Flast court also
set forth a view reemphasized in Warth, Eastern Kentucky,
and their immediate antecedents. This was that "in part those
words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of govern-
ment." 4 At various times, priority has been given to one or the
other of these considerations, but they are consistently ac-
cepted, at least by the courts, as the foundation of constitu-
tional standing.25
Prudential Limitations
Prudential limitations, invoked by a court, may deny a
litigant access to the federal judicial system even if he presents
a "case or controversy" as mandated by article III. These court-
made standing rules are most frequently applied in two distinct
factual situations. In the first, even though a plaintiff asserts
a harm which satisfies the article III standard, he may not be
granted standing if the alleged injury is a "generalized griev-
ance" shared by a large class of citizens.2" In the second, a
plaintiff who passes the constitutional test will nevertheless be
21. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
22. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id.
25. Some authorities feel that the adversary context requirement is not properly
an element of standing. See, e.g., DAVIS TREATISE supra note 10, § 22.00-4, at 723-24(Supp. 1970); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645, 674 (1973).
26. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217(1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-73 (1974); Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923).
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restricted to asserting his own rights and not those of third
parties, except in unique circumstances. 7
The purposes behind these prudential limitations are
much the same as those which shape the article III criteria.
Generally, the courts are both attempting to insure that cases
will be vigorously and competently presented and seeking to
prevent judicial encroachment into areas more amenable to
legislative treatment." Of less significance is the desire to avoid
opening the courts to a flood of litigation by over-enlarging the
class of potential plaintiffs.29 Although the prudential rules
serve more or less the same purposes as those imposed by arti-
cle III, they go beyond it, permitting the courts to confine
themselves to their perceived role in the circumstances of a
particular dispute.
In addition to these court created limitations, the pruden-
tial aspects of standing are shaped to a large extent by congres-
sional power over them. Subject to the minimum article III
requirements, Congress can grant standing as it sees fit to chal-
lenge alleged violations of federal statutes.3° This congressional
power does not alter the basic structure of the standing doc-
trine, since it effectively removes most of the impetus for judi-
cial self-restraint." It simply raises the additional question of
whether a litigant falls within the class to which Congress in-
tended to grant standing.32 Thus, in all cases involving the
27. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 206. Note, Stand-
ing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
28. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
29. This fear of an overwhelming burden on the judicial system has been shown
to be a minor, or even nonexistent problem not worthy of separate consideration in the
standing analysis. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22, at 724 (Supp. 1970);
Scott, supra note 25, at 672-74.
30. By far the broadest of such legislative enactments is the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1966). Numerous standing cases have been
decided under § 702 of the APA which reads: "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." See, e.g., Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Association of Data Pro-
cessing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Congress can also create rights
by statute, the violation of which results in injury in fact. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
31. Prudential standing limitations are primarily designed to restrict the judici-
ary to its proper role. When Congress grants standing in a particular area into which
the judiciary might otherwise hesitate to venture, the proper distribution of power is
maintained and the need for judicial self-restraint is reduced. See Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 236.
32. Under § 702 of the APA the relevant inquiry focuses on who is a person
aggrieved within the meaning of a statute. See note 30 supra. Prior to Eastern
1978]
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violation of federal statutes, the courts must include the possi-
bility of statutory standing in their review of prudential consid-
erations .33
Against this backdrop of basic standing principles, Warth
and Eastern Kentucky were decided. In order to fully compre-
hend the parameters of the standing test they developed, it is
necessary to examine both cases in some detail. This will be
accomplished by first, setting the factual background of each
case; and second, scrutinizing the theoretical foundations of
each case by construing both cases in light of the relevant
precedents. Finally, each case will be analyzed from a func-
tional perspective, revealing some practical considerations
which may have moved the Court to establish the new test.
THE NEW TEST
Factual Background
Warth v. Seldin . 31 In Warth the petitioners sought stand-
ing to challenge alleged exclusionary zoning practices in the
Town of Penfield, New York. The individual petitioners were
taxpayers and a number of persons of low or moderate income,
who also were members of racial or ethnic minority groups, in
the nearby city of Rochester. They claimed that Penfield's zon-
ing ordinance, as written and enforced, excluded persons of low
and moderate income from living in the town, and thereby
violated petitioners' first, ninth, and fourteenth amendment
rights and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1982, and 1983. In addition,
two of the petitioning organizations alleged an interest in pro-
moting the construction of low and moderate cost housing in
the Rochester area, and a third intervened as the representa-
tive of builders and developers who sought to construct such
housing in Penfield.
For purposes of this discussion, the most pertinent portion
of the Warth opinion concerned the Court's treatment of the
individual petitioners' standing claims. While assuming that
the ordinance and its enforcement did effect the exclusion of
Kentucky the Court answered this question in terms of the two-pronged Data
Processing test. See note 5 supra. Now it appears that a claimant under the APA must
not only show injury in fact, but must also allege that such injury resulted directly from
the challenged action and that it is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
33. See Scott, supra note 25 (discussing the distinction between statutory and
nonstatutory standing review).
34. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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persons of low or moderate income from residence in Penfield,
the Court nevertheless observed that the mere fact that peti-
tioners shared attributes with persons whose rights may have
been violated was not enough to afford them standing to sue:
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably
could be inferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive
zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that
they would have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield
and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the as-
serted inability of petitioners will be removed.3"
The majority concluded that petitioners failed to make these
essential allegations."6
The individual petitioners did not claim that the ordi-
nance affected them directly, but rather that its enforcement
against builders and developers prevented construction of suit-
able housing at affordable prices. 7 Indirectness of injury, the
Court noted, did not preclude standing, but it "may make it
substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement
of Art. III: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the
consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective re-
lief will remove the harm." Here, the Court said, there was
no indication that any proposed projects would suit petitioners'
needs at prices they could afford, and those needs, together
with petitioners' financial positions suggested that the cause of
their difficulties was the economics of the local housing market
rather than the challenged ordinance." Furthermore, there was
only a "remote possibility" that petitioners' position would
improve if the requested relief was granted.40
The court summarized its discussion of the position of the
individual petitioners by stating that: "We hold only that a
plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices
must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the
challenged practices harm him, and that he personally would
benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention."'" This
statement was qualified somewhat in a footnote which ex-
plained that the plaintiff need not have a present contractual
35. Id. at 504.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 505.
39. Id. at 506.
40. Id. at 507.
41. Id. at 508.
1978]
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interest in a specific project."2 A "particularized personal inter-
est" is enough. However, the "initial focus" should usually be
on a particular project in this type of exclusionary zoning
case.43
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization." In Eastern Kentucky the respondents sought
standing to challenge an Internal Revenue Service Ruling
granting favorable tax treatment to non-profit hospitals pro-
viding only emergency room services to indigents. They were
an unincorporated association and several non-profit corpora-
tions which represented the interests of indigent persons in
obtaining hospital services and twelve individuals who claimed
that they existed below the poverty level and suffered from
conditions requiring hospital care. The disputed ruling modi-
fied a previous one which had required non-profit hospitals to
provide free services to indigents to "the full extent of its finan-
cial ability" in order to receive charitable status. 5 In contrast,
the new ruling accorded "charitable" status to a hospital desig-
nated Hospital A, and described that institution as providing
only emergency room services to indigents. In addition, the new
ruling expressly removed from the prior one the requirements
relating to caring for patients without charge or at rates below
cost."
The complaint alleged that the new ruling violated both
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)"7 and the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).' 8 The respondents sought relief as persons
aggrieved under section 10 of the APA and as the intended
beneficiaries of the IRC sections granting favorable tax treat-
ment to charitable organizations." They asserted that the new
ruling encouraged hospitals to deny services to indigents and
thereby injured respondents in their opportunity and ability to
receive services in non-profit hospitals. Each individual res-
pondent described a situation in which he or a member of his
family had been denied services at a hospital because of indi-
gency and alleged that the hospitals involved had tax exempt
status.
42. Id. at 508 n.18.
43. Id.
44. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
45. Rev. Rul. 185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
46. Rev. Rul. 545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
47. 426 U.S. at 33-34.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see notes 30 & 32 supra.
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The Court's treatment of both the individuals' and organi-
zations' standing claims in Eastern Kentucky merits attention.
In dealing with the organizations, the Court cited Warth and
Sierra Club v. Morton,5" observing that an organization's ab-
stract concern with a problem is not a substitue for the concrete
injury required by article III. Therefore, the organizations
could sue only as representatives of those of their members who
had suffered injury in fact.5 Thus, the standing question de-
pended upon whether any of the individual respondents or the
indigent organization members could establish actual injury.
In treating the interests of the individual respondents, the
Court acknowledged that they had suffered injury to their ac-
cess to hospital services as a result of indigency. Since no hospi-
tal was a defendant, however, such injury was not sufficient to
establish a case or controversy in the context of the suit. 2 The
Court noted the liberalization of standing law in recent years,
but insisted that the "case or controversy" requirement of arti-
cle III, "that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly
can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not injury that results from the independent action of some
third party not before the court," still remained. 3
Whether the denials of service referred to in the complaint
could be traced to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) encourage-
ments was deemed entirely speculative. Such denials could
also result from decisions made by the hospitals independent
of the new tax ruling. Whether granting the requested relief
would result in those services being provided was considered
equally speculative. Because of this, the individual respon-
dents were found to lack the necessary standing."
"[U]nadorned speculation," the Court concluded, "will not
suffice to invoke the federal judicial power. ' ' 5
Theoretical Foundation
Justice Brennan argued in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Eastern Kentucky, that the majority's decision was
"clearly contrary to the relevant precedents."56 Although the
50. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
51. 426 U.S. at 40.
52. Suit was brought against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue.
53. 426 U.S. at 41-42.
54. Id. at 42-43.
55. Id. at 44.
56. Id. at 46.
1978]
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same could be said about Warth, perhaps a more accurate
statement would be that these two cases go considerably be-
yond any previous applications of direct injury in fact as a
standing test. Other cases have turned on whether the plain-
tiff's injury occurred as a consequence of the defendant's alleg-
edly illegal actions and whether the Court could, or should,
remedy the situation by granting the requested relief. Gener-
ally, these minimum requirements have been easily met. 7 In
the context of Warth and Eastern Kentucky, however, the ele-
ments of direct injury and effective relief emerged as substan-
tial obstacles to standing. One convenient way to assess the
validity of this shift in emphasis is to examine the judicial
precedents the majority relied on in developing its new theory.
Linda R.S. v. Richard D. In both Warth and Eastern
Kentucky, Justice Powell's majority opinions relied on Linda
R.S. v. Richard D.58 for the proposition that unadorned specu-
lation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power. 9 In
that case, the mother of an illegitimate child challenged a state
court construction of a Texas statute providing for punishment
of parents who failed to support their children. She sought to
compel enforcement of the statute against her child's alleged
father, and claimed that the state court ruling, which limited
the effect of the statute to parents of legitimate children, vio-
lated the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall,
held that she lacked standing. Quoting Massachusetts v.
Mellon,69 the Court said that a party seeking to invoke the
power of the federal courts to invalidate a statute must be able
to show "that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as the result of [its] enforce-
ment."6' The Court considered it entirely speculative that en-
forcement of the statute would result in the payment of support
rather than in the jailing of the father.2
Justice Brennan's dissent in Warth attempted to distin-
guish Linda R. S. In a footnote, he argued that in Linda R. S.,
even if everything alleged were proved at trial, it would still be
57. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d
416, 420 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (without reaching standing question);
Boyd v. Gullet, 64 F.R.D. 169, 172 (D. Md. 1974).
58. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
59. 426 U.S. at 44.
60. 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (decided with Frothingham v. Mellon).
61. 410 U.S. at 618.
62. Id.
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impossible to show that the alleged father would be prosecuted,
or if prosecuted, that he would contribute to the support of his
children. In Warth, he continued, the situation was otherwise:
"Here, if these petitioners prove what they have alleged, they
will have shown that respondents' actions did cause their in-
jury." 4 Thus, in Linda R.S. effective relief depended on the
actions of third parties, an element absent in Warth.
The element of third party discretion creates a close paral-
lel between Linda R.S. and Eastern Kentucky, but a distinc-
tion between the former and Warth can be made along the lines
drawn by Justice Brennan." On the one hand, in Linda R.S.
no evaluation of the merits could determine whether the child's
father would choose to pay support or go to jail. On the other
hand, in Warth, if no external factors were involved, the will-
ingness of the developers to construct low and moderate cost
housing would forge the required causal link between the chal-
lenged ordinance and petitioners' alleged injury. However, ex-
ternal factors were present which weakened this causal link
and dissuaded the majority from concluding that effective re-
lief could be granted."
Justice Brennan did not ignore the causation-relief prob-
lems in Warth. Instead, he argued that they should be an-
swered in the process of adjudicating the merits of the dispute.
Lack of specificity in the pleadings, he said, should not deny
petitioners the opportunity to substantiate their claim.67
Justice Brennan's argument is well reasoned, but it ap-
pears to be more a product of his liberal approach to standing
than a strict application of the theory and policy behind the
doctrine.5s The core of the standing question is always whether
or not the plaintiff is a proper party to bring the action. Justice
Brennan's approach makes this important threshold determi-
nation dependent on the plaintiff's success on the merits.
63. 422 U.S. at 526 n.5.
64. Id.
65. Clearly, in Eastern Kentucky the hospitals could have provided the services
called for by the Regulation or discontinued them and forgone charitable status. See
text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
66. For example, in Warth it was unclear if it was economically feasible to build
the housing and, even assuming construction, it was unclear whether the individuals
could have afforded it. See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
67. 422 U.S. at 527.
68. Justice Brennan would limit the standing analysis to the question of whether
the plaintiff has alleged injury in fact. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 235 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Economic uncertainty is a quantity less easily figured into
the standing equation than the fact of a third party's choice of
action on which Linda R.S. turned. However, both factors
affect the directness of injury and the effectiveness of available
relief to the same degree, and they can be equated on those
terms. Unless these standing criteria are to be entirely disre-
garded when the factual complexity of a case reaches some
undefined point, the rationale of Linda R.S. must control. Any
concomitant increase in the plaintiff's pleading burden is un-
fortunate but unavoidable.
The SCRAP case. The Court's brief discussion of United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Practices
(SCRAP)" could have further clarified the "direct" injury in
fact approach but failed to do so. In that case, SCRAP, an
association of five law students, and other environmental
groups challenged an Interstate Commerce Commission
order allowing a surcharge on railroad freight costs. SCRAP
alleged that its members used the area around Washington,
D.C., breathing the air and enjoying the natural resources.
The group claimed that the increased freight rate would
cause a decline in the use of recycled materials, which in turn
would have an adverse effect on the environment. The fact
that many people might suffer the same injury did not bother
the court: "To deny standing to those who are in fact injured
simply because many others are also injured, would mean
that the most injurious and widespread Government actions
could be questioned by nobody."'70 Similarly, the opinion did
not reflect great concern with the attenuated line of causation
presented by the pleadings:
Of course, pleadings must be something more than an
ingenious academic exercise in the conveivable. A plaintiff
must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly
harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can
imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by
the agency's action.7
The Court confined its focus to the pleadings in which the
appellees alleged specific and perceptible harm which distin-
guished them from others. The Court reasoned that if the alle-
gations were untrue the railroad should have moved for sum-
69. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
70. Id. at 688.
71. Id. at 688-89.
[Vol. 18
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mary judgment, but it would not say, based solely on the plead-
ings, that SCRAP's allegations were untruthful."
In Eastern Kentucky, the circuit court concluded that
SCRAP supported the respondents' standing," but the major-
ity of the Supreme Court found this determination erroneous.
It observed that the complaint in SCRAP "alleged a specific
and perceptible harm flowing from the agency action and dis-
tinguished the complaint in Eastern Kentucky as "failing to
allege an injury that fairly can be traced to petitioners' chal-
lenged action. 7
4
Actually, the line of causation in SCRAP was so atten-
uated that it is very doubtful that it could have passed the test
expounded in Warth and Eastern Kentucky.75 However, the
fact that neither of the latter decisions is entirely consistent
with the result in SCRAP should not be seen as detracting from
the new approach. Standing has had such a variegated history
that absolute consistency would no doubt be difficult to
achieve at this juncture. It is better to view the Court's treat-
ment of causation in SCRAP as its last effort on behalf of
liberalized standing before adopting the more stringent ap-
proach which led to the direct injury-effective relief standard.7 1
In another dimension, SCRAP remains an important part
of the standing analysis. A crucial portion of that decision fo-
cused on the degree of harm necessary to constitute particular-
ized injury, and in this respect it has proved invaluable in
defining the scope of the new standing test.77 SCRAP stands for
the proposition that the effect of an injurious action can be
considerably diffused without precluding standing to challenge
it. Even cases admitting the lack of direct injury in SCRAP
have cited it favorably in opining that minimal injury will sup-
port standing.7
72. Id. at 689-90.
73. 426 U.S. at 44 n.25.
74. Id.
75. See Rental Hous. Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388, 390 (lst
Cir. 1977). It has been argued that the Court's leniency in SCRAP stemmed from the
fact that the standing question arose on a motion to dismiss on the pleadings. See
Comment, Standing to Sue in Federal Courts: The Elimination of Preliminary Thresh-
old Standing Inquiries, 51 TUL. L. REv. 119, 142 (1976).
76. See Leedes, Mr. Justice Powell's Standing, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 269, 278-79,
288 (1977).
77. 412 U.S. at 686-90.
78. See, e.g., Rental Hous. Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388 (1st
Cir. 1977). See also Mulqueeny v. National Comm'n on the Observance of Int'l
Women's Year, 1975, 549 F.2d 1115, 1121 (6th Cir. 1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines,
East, 545 F.2d 169, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Data Processing and Barlow. The Eastern Kentucky Court
also found the companion cases of Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organizations v. Camp' and Barlow v. Collins"" in
accord with its decision. To the extent that these cases also
involved alleged injury resulting from governmental action in
regard to a third party they are pertinent to the situation in
Eastern Kentucky. In both Data Processing and Barlow the
Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
actions of government officials. Injury in both cases was clearly
direct, and this was the point emphasized by the Eastern
Kentucky Court in distinguishing them.8
However, very little is added to Eastern Kentucky by ob-
serving the theoretical congruence described. Both Data
Processing and Barlow are more significant for their liberal
analysis of standing under the APA." As one'commentator
observed, the Court's treatment of the Data Processing injury
in fact test has "reduced it to little more than a bar against
suit by intellectually or emotionally concerned bystanders. '8 3
In both Data Processing and Barlow, the directness of injury
was scarcely questioned, and those decisions would seem to
cut the other way. It is more significant to note that if Eastern
Kentucky had been decided under the Data Processing direct
injury-zone of interest test, the result would -probably have
been different. 4
Functional Analysis
A functional analysis of the standing criteria applied in
Warth and Eastern Kentucky provides a more satisfactory ex-
planation for those decisions than do the informative but in-
conclusive precedents cited by the Court. The pre-Warth em-
phasis on the adversary context of a dispute cannot explain the
79. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see note 82 infra.
80. 397 U.S. 159 (1970); see note 82 infra.
81. 426 U.S. at 45 n.25.
82. Data Processing established a two part standing test which required (1)
injury in fact, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected be "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." See note 5 supra. In Barlow, the Court made the broad statement that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a contrary legislative in-
tent" should the courts restrict access to judicial review of administrative action. 397
U.S. at 167.
83. WRIGHT supra note 5, at 196. See also Sadler, Standing, Justiciability, and
All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. Rev. 479 (1972).
84. See 426 U.S. at 58 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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result reached in these latter cases, and it is therefore under-
standable that the decisions employing that approach should
fail to support unequivocally the direct injury and effective
relief requirements. A more substantial foundation for the new
test is apparent in the Court's growing concern with the proper
role of the judiciary as the constitutional basis of standing.
Adversary context of the dispute. As early as Muskrat v.
United States,85 the personal interest of the plaintiff in the
outcome of the litigation was considered an important element
of standing. With Baker v. Carr,"5 a sufficient stake in the
outcome of the controversy "as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
tional questions" 87 became the dominant constitutional consid-
eration. Even Justice Powell, the author of the Warth and
Eastern Kentucky opinions, acknowledged in his concurring
opinion in United States v. Richardson that the personal inter-
est test was the "controlling definition of the irreducible Art.
HI case-or-controversy requirements for standing."" This view
has not totally lost sway. Justice Brennan's concurring and
dissenting opinion in Eastern Kentucky repeatedly emphasizes
that "concrete adverseness flowing from a personal stake in the
outcome" is the only constitutional criteria governing stand-
ing.89
Separation of powers. The majority opinions in Warth and
Eastern Kentucky clearly mark a shift away from the adversary
context approach and toward a standing doctrine based on
separation of powers concerns." This represents a conscious
85. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
86. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It is also worth noting that under Baker, it was not
necessary to decide if the plaintiffs' claims would ultimately entitle them to any relief.
Id. at 208; WIUGHT, supra note 5, at 175. This, of course, is contrary to the position
adopted by the Court in its "effective relief" portion of the new test.
87. 369 U.S. at 204.
88. 418 U.S. 166, 181 (1974).
89. 426 U.S. at 52-53, 56, 59 n.7, 60.
90. Chief Justice Warren said in his majority opinion in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968), that separation of powers tests were not to be read into standing concepts:
The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain
the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems
related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only
from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated.
Id. at 100. The clarity of this observation was somewhat clouded by the subsequent
efforts of the Chief Justice to incorporate personal interest criteria into a standing
analysis which rightfully should have been made on other grounds. See id. at 116-33
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move and is not simply a product of the factual contexts of
those cases. Justice Powell expressly noted this in his concur-
ring and dissenting opinion in Singleton v. Wulff,' a standing
decision which came down soon after Eastern Kentucky. In
reference to the "adversary context" test he said:
While this concern is relevant, it should receive no
more emphasis in this context [prudential] than in the
context of Art. III standing requirements. Perhaps a more
accurate formulation of the Art. I limitation-one consis-
tent with the concerns underlying the constitutional provi-
sion-is that the plaintiffis stake in a controversy must
insure that exercise of the court's remedial powers is both
necessary and sufficient to give relief. A similar focus upon
the proper judicial role, rather than quality of advocacy,
is preferable in the area of prudential limitations upon
judicial power."
This is a significantly different position than that adopted by
Justice Powell in his Richardson concurrence, but it is also one
with substantial support in standing theory. 3
Neither Warth nor Eastern Kentucky presented a tradi-
tional vehicle for a detailed discussion of the judicial function,
and so that concept is referred to only obliquely in those cases.' 4
It is nevertheless apparent that the role of the judiciary was a
basic consideration in the majority's standing analysis. In
Warth, Justice Powell introduced his discussion of standing
with this statement: "In both dimensions it is founded in con-
cern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also WRoirr, supra note 5, at 188.
The interest in separation of powers concerns as potential limits on standing
actually arose before Warth. See id. at 221.
91. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
92. Id. at 124 n.3 (citations omitted).
93. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
94. The prior standing cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed the role
of the judiciary at length have generally involved federal agency action, or congres-
sional acts. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (CIA); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (IRS); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (Matern-
ity Act of 1921).
Such cases pose separation of powers problems in a much more immediate context
than does Worth, which concerned the actions of a local legislative body. In Eastern
Kentucky, it is at least arguable that the Court did not wish to rule on the touchy
question of whether it could ever properly review an IRS Ruling at the insistence of a
third party, although it may actually have answered this question in the negative
nevertheless. See Comment, Should Standing Stand in the Way of IRS Revenue Rul-
ing Accountability?, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 95 (1976); text accompanying notes 115-116
infra.
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in democratic society."' 5 Later in the same opinion he sug-
gested that those unhappy with zoning laws "need not overlook
the availability of the normal democratic process."" The peti-
tioners in Eastern Kentucky contended that the Court would
exceed its power if it permitted suits by third parties which
challenged the tax treatment of other taxpayers. The Court did
not expressly reach this consideration,'7 but it clearly was a
factor in its decision. 8
Direct injury-effective relief test. Although the functional
basis for the direct injury-effective relief test is not outlined in
Warth or Eastern Kentucky, it is not necessary to look far back
into the history of the standing doctrine to find a thorough
explanation of the principles underlying the new approach.
The analytic framework which supports the Warth and Eastern
Kentucky decisions was clearly depicted in United States v.
Richardson" and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War. "I Both these cases involved the standing of taxpayers
or citizens to challenge government action."' Historically, this
type of "generalized grievance""' did not support standing on
the theory that the injury suffered by the taxpayer or citizen
was too indirect. 1 3
95. 422 U.S. at 498.
96. Id. at 508 n.18.
97. 426 U.S. at 37; see note 94 supra.
98. Justice Stewart, concurring, agreed with petitioners. However, he based his
conclusions on an undefined application of standing principles rather than on the
grounds of congressional intent which they had put forth. 426 U.S. at 46.
99. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
100. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
101. See generally DAvis TREATISE, supra note 10, §§ 22.09-.7 (Supp. 1970);
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968); Jaffe, Standing
to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, The
Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116
U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, Citizen as Litigant]; Comment,
Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
102. 392 U.S. at 106.
103. This theory was first articulated in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), which until Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), was thought to completely bar
taxpayer standing.
In Frothingham, a taxpayer was denied standing to enjoin enforcement of the
Maternity Act of 1921, which provided grants of federal funds to states wishing to
institute programs to combat infant and maternal mortality. Mrs. Frothingham
claimed that the Act was beyond the power of Congress to implement and that the
appropriations to fund the Act would increase her tax burden and thus amount to a
taking of her property without due process of law. The Court determined that her
interest as a taxpayer in the use of federal monies was "minute and indeterminable"
and that the injury suffered by her in that capacity was not sufficiently direct to invoke
the power of the court:
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The significance of Richardson and Schlesinger in relation
to the new reliance on direct injury and effective relief as stand-
ing criteria lay not so much in the "direct" or "concrete" injury
language to be found therein as it did in the renewed emphasis
on the position of the judiciary relative to the other branches
of government."' Chief Justice Burger noted in his majority
opinion in Richardson that "[fIn a very real sense, the absence
of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims
gives support to the argument that the subject matter is com-
mitted to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the
political process."'' 5 Justice Powell then devoted an entire sec-
tion of his concurrence to a comprehensive reiteration of the
reasons for restricting judicial power.'0 This theme was echoed
in Schlesinger where the Chief Justice went so far as to suggest
that by exercising its powers in response to important constitu-
tional issues raised outside the context of concrete injury, the
Court would "open the judiciary to an arguable charge of pro-
viding 'government by injunction.' "10 Put in perspective by
the prior focus on these concerns, the approach to standing
outlined in Warth and Eastern Kentucky is hardly the "further
obfuscation of the law of standing" lamented by Justice Bren-
nan.
08
A further concern of Justice Brennan's Warth dissent, 0 9
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the
statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.
262 U.S. at 488. The Court went on to discuss the fact that it had no power to review
the acts of Congress per se, and to describe the circumstances under which such review
is proper. It did this in terms of direct injury and the enforcement of legal rights. The
language from the Frothingham opinion formed the basis for the "legal rights" test
which imposed strict standing criteria until discredited in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) and subsequent cases. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939); WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 179-82; note 135 infra. To complete the circle, an
analogy can be drawn between the emphasis on effective relief in Eastern Kentucky
and other recent standing cases, see, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and
the outmoded "legal interest" test. See WRIrr, supra note 5, at 38 (Supp. 1976).
104. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 38 (Supp. 1976).
105. 418 U.S. at 179.
106. Id. at 188-97.
107. Id. at 222. The absence of important constitutional issues in Eastern
Kentucky suggests that Chief Justice Burger's observation may be validly extended
to cases of statutory enforcement as well.
108. 426 U.S. at 46.
109. 422 U.S. at 520.
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and one echoed by the commentators,"0 was that the majority
was using the direct injury-effective relief test to avoid deciding
difficult constitutional questions. The Court's application of
the test in Eastern Kentucky stilled these fears. That case
raised no constitutional issues whatever. The respondents as-
serted only a violation of their statutory rights, and, as a result,
the functional basis of the direct injury-effective relief test was
clarified."' The new test emerged not as an expedient means
of avoiding complex constitutional issues, but as a useful
guideline in restricting the federal judiciary to its proper role.
In essense, the separation of powers justification for impos-
ing restraints on standing has two dimensions."' First, there is
an inherent limitation on the competence of judicial lawmak-
ing since adversary litigation is not designed to carry out that
purpose. Second, apart from the question of competence, there
is a need to reserve some matters for the political branches as
a matter of democratic principle.
In the intervening third party situations found in both
Warth and Eastern Kentucky, the direct injury-effective relief
test closely coincides with this justification in both dimensions.
The requirement that injury be causally direct serves to coun-
terbalance the courts' essential inadequacy in dealing with
problems of broad social and economic significance by reducing
the question to a clear-cut case suitable for adversary resolu-
tion. "3 By the same token, focusing on the courts' ability to give
meaningful relief reserves to the political branches those mat-
ters within their special competence.
Thus, in Warth, by analyzing the directness of the rela-
tionship between the petitioners' injury and the respondents'
acts, the Court was able to conclude that the amorphous eco-
nomic factors, critical to that relationship, could not be pro-
110. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 1335, at 34 (Supp. 1976); Comment, supra
note 75.
111. Plaintiffs asserted their rights as alleged beneficiaries of the term
"charitable" in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) They also argued that the issuance of the disputed
Rev. Rul., 545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, without a public hearing was a violation of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
112. WRIoHT, supra note 5, at 224-25.
113. See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
The adversary context of a dispute is not of the essence of article Ill standing under
the new test, but it is, to use Justice Powell's term, "relevant." See text accompanying
note 92 supra. Perhaps the crucial difference between the views of Justice Brennan and
Justice Powell on this point is that Brennan would incorporate "adversary context"
as a fixed element of the standing test, while Powell's formulation treats that concept
as an end to be achieved by means of the test.
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perly evaluated in the judicial arena.I" The fact that the perti-
nent economics were a matter of local rather than national
concern did not in any way affect the accuracy of the majority's
analysis. At any level, such matters are outside the courts'
competence." 5 Similarly, in Eastern Kentucky, by employing
the effective relief test and observing that a court-ordered re-
turn to previous IRS policy could not insure increased services
to the respondents, the Court impliedly conceded the Secretary
of the Treasury's authority to administer the tax laws."'
A close analysis of Warth and Eastern Kentucky reveals
the functional and theoretical considerations which spawned
the direct injury-effective relief approach to standing. A con-
venient way to assess the actual impact of the new test is to
trace its development through cases which have attempted to
rely on it.
THE APPLICATION OF THE NEW TEST
The effect of the Warth and Eastern Kentucky decisions
is, by now, apparent. A three part standing test has emerged,
which lower courts have applied more or less uniformly. One
court concisely stated the new test as follows: "Compactly put,
the test for standing applicable to this case is that the plaintiff
must have alleged (a) a particularized injury (b) concretely and
demonstrably resulting from defendant's action (c) which in-
jury will be redressed by the remedy sought.""' 7
This clarity and consistency seems to be a product of the
reiteration of the direct injury-effective relief test in Eastern
114. 422 U.S. at 506 n.16.
115. This extension to the local level of the limiting principles within which the
federal courts operate is also apparent in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In that
case, respondents sought federal equitable relief from alleged police misconduct in the
city of Philadelphia. The district court approved a comprehensive program for the
handling of citizen complaints, which approval was affirmed by the court of appeals.
Petitioner's sought certiorari on the grounds that the district court's action constituted
an "unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority
committed to them by state and local law to perform their official functions." Id. at
366. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision in part on the finding that the
district court's order violated the principles of federalism by limiting the police depart-
ment's administration of its own affairs. Id. at 376-80. After citing numerous instances
of the federal courts' inability to enjoin state criminal proceedings, the Court observed:
"We think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought
not against the judicial branch of the state government, but against those in charge of
an executive branch of an agency of state or local government such as respondents
here." Id. at 380.
116. See Comment, supra note 94, at 96.
117. Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Kentucky since several cases following in the wake of Warth
showed that the nature of the test was not fully understood at
that time.
Problems After Warth
In American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, "' the ACLU
was found to have standing as the representative of its mem-
bers to challenge two FCC rulings pertaining to cable televi-
sion. The ACLU claimed injury to its members resulting from
the failure of the FCC to maximize programming. Even though
the court determined that the truth of the alleged injury could
only be determined by an examination of the merits, it none-
theless chose not to follow Warth. Explaining its decision, the
court observed that, while Warth had revitalized the distinct
and palpable injury standing requirement it had not overruled
either SCRAP or Sierra Club v. Morton."9 In other words, the
ruling followed the cases liberalizing the nature and extent of
injury required for standing rather than observing the strict
causation guidelines laid down in Warth.
By the same token, in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,2" a
case decided under section 4 of the Clayton Act,' the court
applied the Data Processing two-pronged standing test' 2 in-
stead of the "direct injury" approach traditionally used under
the Act. 3 The "direct injury" test, identical to the concept
employed in Warth, was said to require too much from the
plaintiff at the pleading stage."4 Its application, the court ob-
served, allowed the court to "make a determination on the
merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the standing of a
claimant . . . . [T]he entire question of directness is one that
must be resolved upon some factual showing."'25
Another case which distinguished Warth was Planning for
People Coalition v. Du Page City, Illinois. 6 The facts in
Planning for People were almost identical to those in Warth.
As the court observed, the primary difference between the
cases was that in Planning for People the plaintiffs alleged a
118. 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
119. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
120. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
122. See note 5 supra.
123. 521 F.2d at 1150.
124. Id. at 1149.
125. Id. at 1150.
126. 70 F.R.D. 38 (N.D. Il. 1976).
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conspiracy between the city and developers to exclude low-cost
housing projects. Both the individual plaintiffs and one of the
plaintiff organizations were found to have standing to chal-
lenge the exclusionary practices. The court observed that an
inference could be drawn from defendants' actions that, absent
* the challenged practices and the alleged conspiracy, there was
a substantial probability that plaintiffs would find suitable
housing.
Warth was distinguished on the basis that the possibility
existed that the subject exclusion resulted from economic fac-
tors and not conspiracy. While the Planning for People Court
recognized that anyone could circumvent Warth by alleging
conspiracy, it concluded that it was the very require-
ment-that the plaintiff have a personal interest in specific
property-which made such a conspiracy possible.' 7
The Impact of Eastern Kentucky
The Eastern Kentucky decision has reinforced the Warth
approach to standing to such a degree that the new test now
controls over prior liberal decisions and narrow factual con-
struction. Since Eastern Kentucky established direct injury-
effective relief as the minimum constitutional standing re-
quirement, even in cases decided under the APA, it should
preclude future opinions on the order of Malamud, in which the
two-pronged test provided in Data Processing was viewed as
controlling.12 s Similarly, it should help prevent the confusion
which arose in ACLU concerning the distinction between the
extent of injury and directness of injury. Finally, Eastern Ken-
tucky's clear statement of the separation of powers basis for the
127. Id. at 47.
Another pre-Eastern Kentucky case in which the Warth criteria were not strictly
observed was Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 525 F.2d 681 (8th
Cir. 1975). In that case the court misapplied the concept of prudential standing. The
appellants, several shippers, were allowed to challenge tariffs collected by appellees,
motor freight carriers, during the time that an order restraining increased tariffs was
in effect. Without analyzing whether the injury alleged was sufficient to support stand-
ing under Warth, the court found that prudential factors (10 years of litigation) out-
weighed the necessity for constitutional standing. This decision was clearly erroneous,
since prudential standing is invoked only after a plaintiff is found to have the mininum
article III standing. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
128. The "zone-of-interest" portion of the Data Processing test is still a signifi-
cant part of the standing analysis. However, its use is limited to the prudential context
since it is beyond the power of Congress to grant constitutional standing where none
otherwise exists. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 n.ll (1974); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1971).
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new test should overcome the tendency of sympathetic courts
to minimize its application, as in the case of Planning for
People.
The majority opinion in Eastern Kentucky has had the
further beneficial effect of overriding the primary theoretical
objection to the standing approach proposed in Warth. The
objection was that the new test tended to focus on the merits
of the dispute rather than on the suitability of the plaintiff to
litigate it. 2 ' The Eastern Kentucky decision did not resolve the
conflict between the direct injury-effective relief criteria and
the often-stated theory that standing focuses on the claimant
and not the claim asserted. What it did do was establish the
former concept as the controlling test of federal standing in
spite of any theoretical inconsistencies.
Resistance to the new test on the basis of its close relation-
ship to the merits was strong during the period between Warth
and Eastern Kentucky. Commentators criticized Warth for its
apparent disregard of standing theory. 30 Similarly, lower
courts hesitated to apply the strict rule of that decision, argu-
ing that it demanded too much of the plaintiff at the pleading
stage.' 31 This undermined the Warth test by shifting the bur-
den of establishing standing from the plaintiff to the court.
Such an approach engenders criticism by negating the efficacy
of direct injury-effective relief as a standing test and placing it
in the realm of a cursory adjudication of the merits.
The effect of Eastern Kentucky has been to still the objec-
129. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 75, at 142-43.
130. See, e.g., Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to
Judicial Supremacy, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 467 (1976); Wolff, Standing to Sue: Capri-
cious Application of Direct Injury Standard, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 663, 670, 674-75, 678
(1976); Comment, Federal Standing 1976, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383 (1976).
131. See, e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1975); Malamud v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1150 (6th Cir. 1975); Planning for People Coalition
v. Du Page City, Ill., 70 F.R.D. 38, 42 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
In ACLU the court claimed that, under the facts of that case, standing could not
be determined, under the Warth approach, without deciding the dispute on the merits.
As Judge Trask pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the real standing problem was
that the petitioner failed to allege how the defendants' actions had caused or would
cause injury to the ACLU or its members. The Malamud court's criticism of direct
injury in fact directly attacked the problem by stating the opinion that any determina-
tion of directness necessarily requires a factual investigation.
The Planning for People court avoided this dilemma by making its own thorough
investigation of the facts. The rationale given for this procedure was that, "although
not specifically stated, the approach in Worth indicates that the district court should
also look beyond the broad conclusory allegations of the complaint and should scruti-
nize the particular alleged facts to determine if they suggest a personal injury to the
plaintiff which could be remedied by court intervention." 70 F.R.D. at 42.
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tions based on standing theory without answering them. In this
regard, it remains consistent with traditional development of
standing doctrine. Previous tests have shown a similar relation-
ship to the merits of a dispute and were extensively criticized
for that reason. 3 Nevertheless, they prevailed. One such test
was the "legal interest" approach which required a showing of
injury to a legal right of the plaintiff.'3 3 In its purest form, this
test mandated an injury which would support recovery by the
plaintiff if the defendant were a private actor." 4 The effect of
the "legal interest" test was to exclude all but a few categories
of injury.13  This necessarily amounted to a decision on the
merits in the excluded cases since the deciding factor was not
the posture of the plaintiff in relation to the claim asserted, but
rather the very nature of that claim.
More recently, a two part nexus test was expounded in
Flast v. Cohen,138 which involved an initial appraisal of the
substantive issues in the case. Initially, this test required that
a taxpayer establish that the allegedly unconstitutional act was
the result of an exercise of the taxing and spending power.' 37
Additionally, it required the taxpayer to allege the violation of
a specific constitutional limitation on the exercise of that
power.' 38 Thus, the standing question in taxpayer suits focused
on the issue presented rather than on the plaintiff.
Assessing the directness of a plaintiff's injury and the
court's ability to render effective relief does not require any
greater adjudication of the merits than determining whether
the interest asserted is a protectable one or whether it falls
within the ambit of constitutional limitations on the taxing
and spending power. If standing is denied under any of these
theories, it is because the issues presented are not considered
suitable for adjudication. 13 The plaintiff's suitability as an
132. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surro-
gate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Comment, supra note 75.
133. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 179.
134. Id.; Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
135. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 179-80. The Court in Tennessee Electric phrased
the scope of the test as follows: "The principle is without application unless the right
invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 306
U.S. at 137-38.
136. 392 U.S. 83 (1967). See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174
(1974).
137. 392 U.S. at 102.
138. Id. at 102-03.
139. See DAvis TREATISE supra note 10, § 22, at 722 (Supp. 1970).
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advocate of his position may be a prudential factor, but the
basic consideration necessarily involves the merits. 4 To say
that the direct injury-effective relief test is out of line with
traditional standing concepts is thus to ignore the practical
effect of previously prevailing standards. It would be better to
accept the fact that standing does involve at least a superficial
appraisal of the merits than to discard the new test on grounds
which have never had any practical validity.
The Fully-Developed Test in Practice
The great merit of the direct injury-effective relief test is
that it clarifies the role of the judiciary in factual situations
which have previously proved difficult to analyze. What is
more, in keeping with the theory that reduction in pressure on
the judicial system comes not from denying standing in a par-
ticular case, but from excluding similar cases in the future by
means of clear rules,' the new test provides a strict standard,
while maintaining the degree of flexibility necessary to insure
just decisions in infinitely varied factual situations.' However,
if the approach to standing outlined in Warth and Eastern
Kentucky is to have its maximum beneficial effect, it must be
properly applied. Certain difficulties, actual and potential,
have appeared in a minority of lower court cases. It is impor-
tant that the questions presented by these decisions be resolved
so that federal standing does not fall back into the state of
confusion which has characterized it in the past.'43
The efficacy of the new test is illustrated by Bowker v.
Morton.' In that case, plaintiffs were small family farmers in
California who were the beneficiaries of a federal irrigation
project. Under federal law, the beneficiaries of the project were
required to dispose of all land in excess of 160 acres at a price
which assumed the unavailability of water. Plaintiffs brought
suit to have this limitation applied to larger farmers who bene-
fited from a state water project having no such limit. They
claimed injury from their inability to buy land in the state
project and alleged that such injury resulted from the fact that
the federal restriction was not enforced against the larger farm-
140. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
141. Scott, supra note 25, at 672-73.
142. See Leedes, supra note 76, at 289.
143. See text accompanying notes 153-168 infra.
144. 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ers. The district court upheld the plaintiffs' standing on the
basis of the Data Processing direct injury-zone of interest
test.'45 The Ninth Circuit reversed, denying standing for failure
to plead facts sufficient to meet the direct injury-effective relief
requirement.'
On the facts of this case, it was plainly speculative whether
granting the relief sought would enable plaintiffs to buy land
in the state project." 7 They did not allege any efforts to buy
or that the requested enforcement would result in prices they
could, in fact, afford. In this situation, the new test proved
effective in at least three respects. First, the court was spared
the difficulty of assessing whether plaintiffs were within the
zone of interests to be protected by the federal law. Second, the
amorphous policy considerations inherent in the situation did
not have to be resolved in a judicial arena designed for the
resolution of more direct conflict. Third, the agencies involved
were allowed the discretion properly afforded them in a tripar-
tite system of government.
Although Bowker is perhaps the best example of the new
test as a practically effective standard, that status is further
confirmed by the already apparent frequency and consistency
with which the test is applied throughout the federal court
system.' 8 This trend clearly demonstrates that there is a place
for the direct injury-effective relief test in the doctrine of fed-
eral standing. Given this widespread acceptance, the issue then
becomes whether this approach solves the uncertainty which
plagued even the most clearly articulated of the prior standing
tests.
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW TEST
In contrast to prior standards, the three part test dictated
by Warth and Eastern Kentucky demands well defined allega-
145. See note 5 supra.
146. 541 F.2d at 1349-50.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. & Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Mulqueeny v. National
Comm'n on the Observance of Int'l Women's Year, 1975, 549 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1977);
Rental Hous. Ass'n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1977); Gray
v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bowker v. Morton, 541 F.2d
1347 (9th Cir. 1976); Central South Carolina Chapter v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182(D.S.C. 1977); Rocky Ford Hous. Auth. v. United States Dep't of Ag., 427 F. Supp.
118 (D.D.C. 1977); NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Su n. 102 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Rohm & Haas
Co. v. International Trade Comm'n, 554 F.2o .62 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (per curiam).
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tions which are clearly susceptible to evaluation by the courts.
Evaluating the elements of previous standing tests often posed
thorny problems for the courts. For example, the "zone of inter-
est" portion of the Data Processing test often required thorough
analysis of legislative intent. 149 This process was often complex
and time consuming. Also, in many cases, it was impossible to
determine conclusively that Congress meant to include a par-
ticular plaintiff within the ambit of a remedial statute. 5 ' Simi-
larly, the question of whether a plaintiff had suffered an injury
sufficient to motivate him to present his case vigorously, long
the test of standing after Baker v. Carr, required a subjective
determination which was difficult to make conclusively. 5'
The elements of the new, direct injury-effective relief test,
on the other hand, are well within the evaluative competence
of the courts. A number of recent decisions have addressed the
question of whether the plaintiff's injury is sufficiently particu-
larized to distinguish him from the general populace. While
frequently litigated, this problem is well-defined and has sel-
dom proved difficult to resolve, particularly in light of SCRAP.
By the same token, the decisions required by the second and
third elements are familiar to the courts and are particularly
suited to judicial determination. Courts are accustomed to
tracing the causal connection between action and injury. Simi-
larly, since granting relief is the raison d'etre of the federal
judiciary, it is unquestionably important that that relief be
effective. By insuring that each decision makes a difference,
the courts protect their own power and credibility. Although
the courts may find difficulty in rendering authoritative deci-
sions from reams of unverified and conflicting empirical data,
evaluating the effectiveness of legal and equitable remedies
poses no such problem.'
In spite of the fact that direct injury-effective relief test
promises easier application and more definitive results than
prior formulations, its ultimate boundaries are still undeter-
mined. Certain factual situations raise questions concerning
the proper application of the new criteria. In other instances,
149. See Hasl, Standing Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 12, 33-39 (1973).
150. See generally id.
151. See Jaffe, Citizen as Litigant, supra note 101, at 1037-38; Comment, supra
note 1, at 127-30.
152. But the likelihood of effective relief has not always been considered an
element of standing. See note 86 supra.
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lower federal courts have demonstrated a reluctance to treat
the direct injury-effective relief test as determinative. Al-
though the majority of standing decisions since Eastern
Kentucky utilize the new test as the Supreme Court intended,
the nature and frequency of the discrepancies is such that dis-
cussion of them here is warranted.
Particularized injury. One significant question which has
arisen in recent standing decisions concerns the degree of harm
necessary to satisfy the particularized injury portion of the
standing test. This was the question posed in SCRAP, and it
is frequently cited for the proposition that injury does not have
to be substantial to support standing.
A workable approach to the particularized injury problem
which remains consistent with the new test was presented in
Rental Housing Association of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills. 5 In
that case, the owners and managers of apartments in Lynn,
Massachusetts challenged the action of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development in awarding financial assis-
tance to a housing project which proposed to convert a factory
into low income housing for the elderly. The owners and man-
agers alleged that they would be injured by the resulting reduc-
tion in funds for further projects and by the possibility that
they would lose tenants to the new project. The district court
dismissed the suit for lack of standing.154
The court of appeals reversed, holding that although a
mere reduction in available funds was not a sufficient allega-
tion of particularized injury under Eastern Kentucky, competi-
tion and probable loss of tenants could serve as the basis for
standing.'55 Citing SCRAP, the court observed that administra-
tive action likely to cause harm could be challenged, even
where specific proof of injury was not possible since the antici-
pated harm had not yet materialized.'56
Other cases have further defined the extent of harm which
will constitute particularized injury. In Rocky Ford Housing
Authority v. United States Department of Agriculture, the
owners of "qualified" housing were found to have standing to
challenge the refusal of the Secretary of Agriculture to imple-
153. 548 F.2d 388 (lst Cir. 1977).
154. Id. at 389.
155. Id. at 389-90.
156. The defendants argued that the proposed project would be too small to have
substantial competitive impact. The court replied that SCRAP clearly demonstrated
that injury need not be substantial to support standing. Id. at 390.
[Vol. 18
FEDERAL STANDING
ment a rural rent supplement program.'57 As in the Greater
Lynn case, the possibility of economic harm was deemed a
sufficient allegation of particularized injury.' Other grounds
for standing have included an individual's first amendment
interest in the right to publish and receive information"9 and
an employee's psychological well-being and treatment at
work. 0
Direct injury. A second area of uncertainty in the new
doctrine is the requirement that the harm alleged result di-
rectly from the challenged action. In Warth, the Court sug-
gested that directness of injury in exclusionary zoning cases
would depend on the existence of a particular project, and this
has become the accepted standard for cases of that type.'' No
such criterion has been posited for the many other situations
in which the question of directness may arise.
The problem is basically one of insuring that the alleged
injury is adequately linked to the defendant's action without
requiring detailed proof or an in-depth consideration of the
merits at the pleading stage. Few cases have addressed this
question directly. However, a possible standard of specificity
was suggested in Greater Lynn. As outlined earlier, the plain-
tiffs in that case alleged that they would be injured by the loss
of tenants to a new federally funded project. In light of these
allegations, including the existence of sufficient low income
housing in the community, the court said that it could "see no
insurmountable obstacle to proof of the likelihood that Rental
Housing Association's members will loose [sic] tenants to the
'Hoague-Sprague' project."'' 2
In order to emphasize that its ruling was only an initial
evaluation of the pleadings for the purpose of deciding the
standing question, the court further insisted that its "opinion
157. 427 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977).
158. Id. at 124 (economic harm or injury to statutory interest in providing low-
income housing).
159. See, e.g., Health Syss. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F.
Supp. 256, 271-73 (E.D. Va. 1976).
160. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"Mere interest" however, will not support standing. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); Mulqueeny v. National Comm'n on the Observance of Int'l Women's Year,
1975, 549 F.2d 1115, 1121 (7th Cir. 1975).
161. See Note, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Land Use Devices in Federal
Courts After Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. REv. 323, 350-54 (1977). See generally Note,
The Causal Nexus: What Must be Shown for Standing to Sue in Federal Courts, 29
U. FLA. L. Rav. 250 (1977).
162. 548 F.2d at 389.
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does not relieve plaintiff from the necessity of establishing in
the record facts sufficient to confirm standing along the lines
indicated, nor does it deny defendants the right to introduce
contrary evidence. We, of course, express no views on the mer-its.",m:
This approach is entirely consistent with Warth and
Eastern Kentucky. In those cases a possibly "insurmountable
obstacle" did exist. In Warth the economics of the local hous-
ing market reduced the likelihood that a project suiting peti-
tioners' needs would be constructed. In Eastern Kentucky, the
Court could not say that the hospitals in question would not
choose to forego favorable tax treatment. In contrast, Greater
Lynn dealt with a situation in which injury was more likely
than not.
By focusing on the existence or nonexistence of an
"insurmountable obstacle" to proof of standing, a court can
relieve some of the heavy pleading burden which Justice Bren-
nan found so offensive in his Warth dissent.' 84 This approach
requires that plaintiffs show only that it is more likely than not
that the alleged injury resulted from the challenged action. The
result is that the directness of the injury is removed from the
realm of "mere speculation" and actual proof is reserved to its
proper place in the adjudication of the merits.
The "insurmountable obstacle" test applied in Greater
Lynn reasonably mitigates the heavy pleading burden which
might be imposed by a strict interpretation of Warth and
Eastern Kentucky, but other cases show a tendency to over-
liberalize the new standing criteria. One or two decisions have
simply assumed standing and gone on to decide the merits.' 5
163. Id. at 391.
Language in Rocky Ford suggests that a similar test of probability rather than
absolute proof, could be applied to the "effective relief" element. There the court
required only that the plaintiffs show it was "more than speculative" that the exercise
of the court's remedial powers would result in the availability of low cost housing to
the plaintiffs. 427 F. Supp. at 424.
The Greater Lynn court's emphasis on the need for plaintiffs to prove the claims
which entitle them to standing has been expressed in somewhat different terms by one
commentator. He observed that the advance consideration of the effectiveness of the
remedies sought, present in Eastern Kentucky, can be read.in conjunction with Rizzo
v. Goode to mean "that standing may be denied if, after litigation of the merits, the
court concludes that none of the plaintiff's claims entitle them to relief." WRIGHT,
supra note 5, at 37 (Supp. 1976).
164. 422 U.S. 490, 525-28.
165. See, e.g., United Health Clubs of America v. Strom, 423 F. Supp. 761
(D.S.C. 1976); United States v. Lewisburg Area School Dist., 398 F. Supp. 948 (M.D.
Penn. 1975), rev'd, 539 F.2d 301 (3rd Cir. 1976).
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Others have found that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but have
refused to consider that fact determinative and have decided
the case on the merits nevertheless.'66 Another emphasized the
fact that the question arose in the context of a motion for
summary judgment and thus pointed out the possibility of mis-
application of the new test in that context.'67
The liberal treatment of the standing question by those
courts which simply assume standing or ignore the lack of it
is out of line with Warth, Eastern Kentucky, and general
standing theory. First, by assuming standing and deciding a
case on the merits, a court decreases the usefulness of the
standing doctrine as a means of reducing the work load of the
federal courts. Second, where a court proceeds to decide a case
on other grounds after having determined that the plaintiff
lacks standing based on the injury pleaded, it runs the risk of
overemphasizing judicial economy, at the expense of leaving
important separation of powers questions posed by the case
unanswered.'
Despite those aspects of the new approach which need
further clarification, the direct injury-effective relief test has
supplied a manageable tool for handling complex standing
problems. It seems clear that the test has gone a long way
towards dispelling the uncertainty which traditionally plagued
previously articulated standing tests.
CONCLUSION
In Warth v. Seldin and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization the Supreme Court expounded a new
constitutional standing test. This approach reversed the pre-
vious trend toward liberalized standing by insisting that a
plaintiff allege a particularized injury, directly resulting from
166. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976).
167. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In
the context of summary judgment, the potential for misapplication is inherent in the
nature of the motion. On the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the burden
is on him to show that he did not injure the plaintiff. His allegations will necessarily
affect the adequacy of the plaintiff's pleading. This might cause a court to shift the
standing focus from the plaintiff's pleading to that of the defendant. However, the fact
that defendant fails to allege that plaintiff was not injured or that the injury was not
a result of defendant's actions, should not be an excuse for the plaintiff's failure to
plead with the specificity demanded by Warth and Eastern Kentucky. This seems rea-
sonable since even if the defendant fails to carry his burden, a summary judgment is
proper if the plaintiff does not meet his pleading requirements. See also 426 U.S. at
37 n.15.
168. See City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976).
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defendants' action and redressable by the remedy sought.
The direct injury-effect relief test lacks support in preced-
ent, but the concern with separation of powers which forms its
basis is well-grounded in standing theory. After Warth and
prior to Eastern Kentucky the new standard was much criti-
cized, partially because it was a departure from prior case law
and partially because it threatened to result in cursory adjudi-
cation of the merits. Critics also contended that the new test
would be used as a means of avoiding complex constitutional
questions.
Clarification of the direct injury-effect relief criteria in
Eastern Kentucky stilled the bulk of this opposition. The lower
courts had demonstrated some reluctance to apply the rule
outlined in Warth, but reiteration of that test in Eastern
Kentucky provided more distinct guidelines. Eastern Ken-
tucky's nonconstitutional context also helped establish direct
injury-effective relief as a true standing test rather than a
means of avoiding constitutional issues. Furthermore, the in-
terrelationship of standing and the merits had never proved
fatal to prior standing tests, and Eastern Kentucky showed
that the same was true of the new one.
The direct injury-effective relief test has proved effective
both as an aid in establishing strong precedents for future
standing decisions and as a means of resolving complex separa-
tion of powers problems. Courts are familiar with the determi-
nations required by the new test and can make them compe-
tently and comfortably. By the same token, the direct injury-
effective relief analysis screens out issues more amenable to
legislative or political treatment and helps to insure that the
courts will handle only those matters for which they were de-
signed.
Although the approach introduced by Warth and Eastern
Kentucky dispells much of the confusion which previously
characterized the law of federal standing, some aspects of the
test require further clarification. The degree of specificity re-
quired in the pleadings is still at issue. One realistic solution
which has been suggested is that plaintiff must at least show
that there is no "insurmountable obstacle" to proving that he
has suffered harm as a result of defendant's actions.
Another question yet unresolved concerns the extent of
harm necessary to support standing. Cases following SCRAP
have determined that minimal harm will usually suffice. For
instance, the possibility of economic harm or allegations of
injury to mental well-being have been accepted.
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A tendency to liberalize the strict requirements articulated
in Warth and Eastern Kentucky has appeared in a few lower
court cases. One observable inconsistency is the practice of
assuming standing and passing on to the merits of the case.
This approach tends to devalue standing as a tool for screening
out similar cases in the future and reducing the workload of the
federal judiciary.
Courts may also avoid or reduce the efficacy of the new test
by failing to treat it as dispositive. In such situations a court
will find that a plaintiff lacks standing but proceed to decide
the case on the merits nevertheless. Although the asserted ra-
tionale for this practice is a desire to avoid prolonged litigation
where amendment of the pleadings to state standing grounds
is a possibility, reluctance to decide cases on the standing issue
can result in a failure to fully examine possible separation of
powers questions.
Numerous lower court cases have applied the direct injury-
effective relief test since Warth and Eastern Kentucky were
decided. A review of these cases shows the difficulties inherent
in the new standard to be surprisingly slight and few. Unques-
tionably, this efficiency in an area of the law previously consid-
ered amorphous and obscure stems from the fact that the new
test is strict and clearly articulated, yet flexible at the same
time. It appears likely that the doctrine of standing will remain
anchored to Warth and Eastern Kentucky for a long time to
come. In any event, the direct injury-effective relief approach
is not the "further obfuscation of the law of standing" la-
mented by Justice Brennan. At best, it may be the long-sought
formula which will establish standing as a vigorous and useful
concept in the federal courts.
Judson T. Farley
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